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WHAT FACTORS DETERMINE THE OUTSOURCING INTENSITY? 
Abstract: 
The present paper investigates the determinants of outsourcing production using a panel of 93 
Spanish manufacturing industries for the period 1993-2002. Outsourcing is measured as 
production tasks which are contracting out to external suppliers, a more direct and suitable 
indicator. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity, our results show a 
high persistence of the outsourcing intensity. Moreover, outsourcing of production is positively 
related to unit labour costs, skills requirements, national ownership and orientation to 
international markets. We also find evidence for a negative link between the outsourcing 
intensity and the share of small firms. 
 
JEL classification: L23, L60. 
 
Key words: Outsourcing, Manufacturing Industries, Explanatory Factors, Unit Labour Costs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to international empirical evidence, a new and complex production 
organization strategy is currently being developed. This strategy, called fragmentation of 
production, favours the splitting up of production processes into more specialized and discernible 
phases in order to obtain the most efficient producer and location for each product or component. 
It is devised mainly by developed-countries' enterprises, which face a very competitive market 
where, on the one hand, products coming from developing countries are highly competitive due 
to lower labour and production costs and, on the other hand, customers demand highly 
differentiated products. The main aim of adopting it is to take advantage of specialization and 
scale economies in components or other production tasks by specialized suppliers as well as to 
gain flexibility to respond to demand changes quicklyi. In this way, firms specialize in those 
activities or phases where they have a competitive edge seeking to improve production 
efficiency, and consequently, their competitiveness.  
Two dimensions of fragmentation can be distinguished (Curzon Price, 2001; Kimura and 
Ando, 2005): an ownership dimension and a geographical dimension (Figure 1). The first one 
refers to the controllability of a firm over fragmented production and the second one does to the 
geographical location of that segmented production. One of the most important features of 
fragmentation of production is that more and more often goes beyond the boundaries of the firm. 
When the segmented production is carried out by other independent firms, the term outsourcingii 
is used. Outsourcing comprises dimensions 2 and 3 of fragmentation of production in Figure 1. It 
is important to note that even though there is no direct shareholder control over the segmented 
phases, it does not mean that there is not any control over them at all. Transactions cannot be 
considered completely independent market transactions for two reasons: firstly, because the 
relationship between companies has a long-term nature, and secondly, because of the great 
quantity of information, such as detailed instructions and specifications, which the external 
provider receives. As Curzon Price (2001) points out, outsourcing lies somewhere in between 
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total ownership and complete arm’s length transactions. Moreover, the externalized production 
can be outsourced to suppliers located abroad (international or foreign or cross-border 
outsourcing) or to domestic providers (national or domestic outsourcing). 
Outsourcing of production is thus understood as a process of vertical disintegration of the 
value chain where some phases or even the whole production process are now contracting out to 
external enterprises instead of performing inside the firm. This is the aspect of fragmentation we 
want to study. Our data can not allow to distinguish between national or foreign suppliers, so we 
focus on total outsourcing which comprises domestic and cross-border outsourcing. 
Understanding what factors determine the intensity of total outsourcing production using panel 
data is the object of the present paper.  
In spite of the increasingly use of outsourcing of production activities according to 
business pressiii and academic literature, empirical research about its determinants remains very 
limited: Kimura (2001) and Tomiura (2005) for Japanese manufacturing industry, Görg and 
Hanley (2004) for Irish electronics industry, Girma and Görg (2004) for some UK manufacturing 
industries and Holl (2004) for Spanish manufacturing industry. Of these, only the last three are 
panel data instead of cross-section analysis and exclusively Görg and Hanley (2004) and Girma 
and Görg (2004) try to infer the factors that may affect th  level of outsourcing, whereas Holl 
(2004) focuses on the determinants of the probability that a firm does take the decision of 
outsourcing using a probit model.  
Hence, as far as the author knows, our study is the first on the determinants of 
outsourcing intensity using panel data for the Spanish manufacturing industry. The estimation 
includes the GMM approach proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) especially suitable to deal 
with models for moderately persistent series from short panels. Furthermore, this paper 
contributes to the empirical literature by employing a direct and more adequate indicator for 
outsourcing of internal production. This type of outsourcing is often measured by the ratio of 
material intermediate inputs to output. But this is a broad measure because it includes raw 
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materials purchases and arms-length purchases of standardized components in the market. A 
specific characteristic of outsourcing is that the relationship between the firm which contracts out 
production and external provider is long-term and it usually implies sharing information about 
the product. That is, purchases of intermediate inputs through a usual marketing channel have 
not to be regarded as outsourcing. As Grossman and Helpman (2005) notes “outsourcing means 
more than just the purchases of raw materials and standardized intermediate goods”. At the same 
time, the ratio of material intermediate inputs to output is a narrow indicator because it does not 
capture the outsourcing of the final production stage, the assembly or specific production tasks. 
For these reasons, we use an indicator that fulfils these required conditions. This is 
Production works done by other firms which refers to tasks which being a part of the own 
production process are carried out by other firms. It involves contracting out manufacturing of 
parts and components and also any stage of the production process such as product design or 
specific tasks (for instance, in the textile industry, tailoring or press ironing) or even the final 
assemblyiv. That is, neither external services such as maintenance of fixed assets, accounting, 
consulting, cleaning, transportation, etc., nor purchases of raw materials and supplies such as 
office materials or fuel are included. Subcontracts are included within this conceptv.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly review previous 
literature on the determinants of outsourcing. In section III we describe the data set used for the 
empirical analysis and then we present some descriptive statistics as well as the econometric 
model. The results of the empirical estimation are showed in section IV. Lastly, in section V, 
some conclusions are made. 
II. DETERMINANTS OF OURTSOURCING OF INTERNAL PRODUCTION. 
Companies will opt for outsourcing when externalisation of certain value chain phases 
allows them to reduce costs and when de-internalizing has more advantages than in-house 
production. The technological revolution that has taken place in last decades has allowed for a 
significant drop in the costs associated with finding information, transport communication and 
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business coordination, lowering the transaction costs and augmenting the possibilities for 
outsourcing.  
According to transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), outsourcing 
would entail a variety of coordination costs associated with various aspects of inter-firm 
transactions. Search costs to find the right supplier, negotiation costs, costs to design the contract 
and the incomplete contracts problem, coordination costs, technology transfer risks, etc. have to 
be consideredvi. At the same time, firms which outsource production search to obtain two types 
of advantages: first, an increase of flexibility for adapting to changes in demand and 
technological conditions and, second, a reduction in production costsvii.
If firms outsource in order to reduce costs relative to in-house production and, therefore, 
to increase efficiency, we would expect that those firms and sectors where the labour costs are 
higher were more active in outsourcing strategy. To test the relevance of the labour cost-saving 
motive for outsourcing, Girma and Görg (2004) include the wage rates for skilled and unskilled 
workers. However, they do not obtain conclusive results. The sign of the coefficient changes 
depending on the manufacturing industry and on the estimation technique and frequently the 
variable is statistically insignificant. Görg and Hanley (2004) introduce the average wage per 
employee when they investigate outsourcing determinants. They also find that the effect of 
wages is statistically insignificant and not robust to different estimation techniques. Holl (2004) 
does obtain a positive and significant coefficient of the wages on the probability of 
subcontracting products, parts and components. 
In our opinion, a variable more relevant than wage is unit labour cost, that is, the 
remuneration of labour to produce one unit of output. This indicator of cost pressures in the 
labour market is computed as the ratio of labour cost to output. It is measured as well as the ratio 
of labour cost per worker (or per hour worked) divided by labour productivity (output per worker 
or per hour worked). By this way, changes in unit labour cost are the result of two forces: 
changes in wage rate and changes in productivity. It has been assumed that high wage firms do 
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more outsourcing because the cost cutting motive will be more important. But those high wages 
could respond to higher efficiency due to high skills, resulting in lower unit labour costs. That is, 
it would be the wage, once productivity differences are taken into account, one of the key drivers 
of outsourcing. Hence, we expect that high unit labour cost manufacturing industries tended to 
contract out more production works than the restviii. This result would confirm the initial 
hypothesis that fragmentation of internal production is an strategy carried out by developed-
country firms in order to improve their efficiency in a context of strong competitiveness coming 
from cheaper labour regions.  
As Abraham and Taylor (1996) suggest, the cost savings derived from outsourcing can be 
obtained by two ways: first, exploiting the economies of scale in producing these specialized 
components or phases which are being contracted out (outsourcing for specialization) and, 
second, turning fixed costs in variable costs and gaining flexibility if there are frequents 
fluctuations in the product demand (outsourcing for capacity). 
The specialization motive for outsourcing introduces firm size as a determinant of this 
strategy. There may be economies of scale in the production of specific inputs and, in this sense, 
size variable have to be considered to control for this scale economies effect. Since small and 
medium enterprises will have more difficulties to reap the minimum efficient scale, they will opt 
more intensively for outsourcing.  
Nevertheless, we also argue that outsourcing is an strategy for gaining flexibility that 
allows large firms to reduce their rigidity. In a very strong competence environment, a high 
grade of product differentiation is increasingly required. Consumers demand more and more 
specific product characteristics and firms have to achieve flexibility to adapt to changes in 
consumer wishes. Contracting out the manufacturing of specific components or tasks is one of 
the alternatives to obtain it. That is, firms would tend to back to the basics focussing on those 
activities where they are more efficient and outsourcing the rest. In this sense, large firms have 
more incentives to carried out this process of vertically de-integration of production structures. 
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Another reason to expect a positive relationship between size and outsourcing intensity is 
proposed by Tomiura (2005), who suggests that smaller firms could face to higher search costs, 
that is, due to stronger market power large firms might find contracting partners more easily.  
The sign of firm size is, therefore, ambiguous. Whereas empirical works such as Holl 
(2004) have obtained positive coefficients, the sign is negative in Görg and Hanley (2004). This 
last study, however, excludes small firms because it uses a Survey that provides information only 
for firms with thirty or more employees. 
The size or thickness of the market is also related with the outsourcing intensity. The 
larger the market, the more chance of finding a good external supplier and, therefore, more likely 
to engage in outsourcing. Grossman and Helpman (2002) and McLaren (2000) consider the 
effects of market thickness on the outsourcing of intermediate inputs in their transaction cost 
models where the trade off between vertical integration and outsourcing is investigated. Since 
international trade increases the ease for a firm to math with an specialized input provider, one 
expects that higher international trade lead to a rise in outsourcing through an increase in market 
thickness. Empirical works such as Görg and Hanley (2004) introduce export propensity pointing 
that export propensity may have a positive effect on outsourcing. It could be argued that the 
more a company exports, the more the possibilities ther  are in finding specialized foreign 
suppliers.  
Previous works usually control for ownership nationality. According to Görg and Hanley 
(2004) and Girma and Görg (2004), since foreign firms are part of an international network 
competing in a global market, the potential to contract out to more efficient producers abroad 
increases. Hence, it could be assumed that they do more outsourcing than domestic firms. 
However, if foreign affiliates are located in a country just for doing production tasks for the 
parent company, the possibility from these manufacturing plants for using subcontractors could 
decrease. The sign of national ownership variable is, as well as firm size, ambiguous and will be 
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an empirical matter. Previous works have obtained positive signs (Girma and Görg, 2004) but 
also negative signs (Holl, 2004; Görg and Hanley, 2004).  
Finally, it seems reasonable that the decision about the outsourcing intensity in period t is 
related to the level of outsourcing in previous period t-1. The lagged dependent variable is taken 
into account to consider the persistence in the outsourcing decision (Girma and Görg, 2004). 
Moreover, Swenson (2004) shows that outsourcing exhibits hysteresis caused by sunk entry costs 
using data of the U.S. offshore assembly program. The existence of important transaction costs 
would explain the persistence in the outsourcing intensity. They are a key difficulty in the 
decision of outsourcing internal production according to the theoretical model by Grossman and 
Helpman (2002). These costs will be higher in the first moments, when the outsourcing strategy 
is becoming to be used. There would be sunk entry costs associated with outsourcing strategy 
(such as search costs in finding a suitable provider). In following years, transaction costs 
probably will be decreasing and they will be compensated by the advantages of farming out parts 
of the production process. These explanatory variables and the expected signs in previous 
outsourcing literature are summarized in table 2. 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION. 
 In order to investigate the determinants of outsourcing of internal production we use 
industry level data for manufacturing in Spain. The data are derived from the Industrial 
Companies Survey (Encuesta Industrial de Empresas) published by the Spanish National 
Statistics Institute. The Survey, which is undertaken annually since 1993, provides information 
on employed persons, wages, hours worked, sales, intermediate inputs, external services and 
some more variables for 93 manufacturing industries. The sectors correspond mostly to the 3-
digit level of NACE Rev.1 (Table 1). The Survey basic unit is industrial company with one or 
more remunerated employed persons. Approximately 43,000 firms compose the sample in 2002. 
The inclusion of the variable Production works done by other firms, as defined in the 
introduction section, makes the Survey particularly interesting for our analysis of outsourcing of 
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internal production. We measure outsourcing of internal production as the ratio of these 
production tasks carried out by other firms to gross output. If the ratio goes up, we interpret that 
manufacturing firms are replacing in-house production for external contract production. 
Figure 2 plots the extent of outsourcing for Spanish manufacturing industries in 2002. We 
observe the heterogeneity in the outsourcing intensity among sectors. Outsourcing level is higher 
for Textile Industries, Wearing Apparel, Footwear, Publishing and Printing, Fabricated Metal 
Products and Shipbuilding and Aerospace Industry. All of them show fragmentation levels well 
above 10% of gross production, and 20% for the last two sectors. According to this indicator, for 
the average Spanish manufacturing industry around 5% of output are production works 
contracted out to outside producers. Moreover, our data show that fragmentation of production 
has increased steadily in many sectors (average rise of 40% from 1993 to 2002) ix. Therefore, we 
find evidence of the growing disintegration of the production process and rising of outsourcing 
production activities in Spain. 
In order to obtain more information about the characteristics of those sectors where 
outsourcing is more intensive, we use a classification which cluster industries by their typical 
input combinations: labour-intensive, technological-driven, capital intensive, marketing-driven 
and mainstream manufacturing industries (Peneder, 1999). Outsourcing is common to all groups 
of industries. Nevertheless, it is more relevant for labour-intensive industries where most of these 
sectors shows outsourcing levels above average, many of them even above 10% of the gross 
production (which can be interpreted as a high level of outsourcing). So, we argue that industries 
producing goods intensive in labour relative to capital and technology seem to give stronger 
support to fragmentation based on contract out physical production to specialized producers than 
the rest of industries (Figure 3). 
To analyse the determinants of outsourcing of internal production we consider the 
following regression equation which relates outsourcing intensity to a broad range of industry’s 
characteristics: 
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OUTSit = 0 + 1OUTSi,t-1 + 2ULCit + 3%Small-Firmsit + 4National-own.it + 
5Export-prop.it +  7DSKILLSit +8Dt + uit (1) 
Where i represent the 92 manufacturing sectorsx, t is the time period 1993-2002, OUTS is 
the outsourcing level measured as production works carried out by other firms per unit of output, 
UCL are the unit labour costs measured as defined above and %Small-Firms variable is the 
percentage of small firms (less than 20 employees) in a sector. We include a variable of 
ownership nationality (National-own.) which reflects the percentage of domestic firms (those 
with one hundred percent of national capital). Export-prop. is the export propensity ratio 
measured as exports to output. If firms use outsourcing as a cost-cutting strategy, we would 
expect that high skill sectors gave stronger support to fragmentation based on contracting out 
production phases to specialized producers than the rest of the industries, mainly those 
production tasks more intensive in low skilled labourxi. For this reason, the model also includes a 
dummy variable to control for high skill requirements (DSKILLS), which takes on value 1 for 
sectors with high skill requirements and 0 for the rest using the Peneder (1999) classification. 
This classification is based on the OECD’s occupational data, which distinguish between white 
and blue-collar workers, on the one hand, and between high and low skilled labour on the other. 
At last, 10 time dummies are introduced to control for period-specific effects. 
The equation (1) represents a standard dynamic model, where lagged dependent variable 
is included among the regressors. Furthermore, we will treat the unit labour cost variable as 
endogenous, since it is conceivable that changes in outsourcing level lead to changes in future 
unit labour cost. For similar reasons, we consider the share of small firms and the export 
propensity ratio as not strictly exogenous and we also include these variables lagged. 
We calculate the outsourcing intensity, the unit labour costs and the percentage of small 
firms from data of the Industrial Companies Survey. Data for the ownership are drawn from the 
firm level panel survey, the Survey of Firm Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
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Empresariales, ESEE) of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology which offers data for 
20 manufacturing industries.  
All variables are expressed in logarithms. We use a one-way error component model for 
the disturbance term, uit = i + it, where i denotes the unobservable individual specific effects 
that are independent and identically distributed (iid) over the sectors with variance 2 and it 
denotes the remainder disturbance that are iid over the whole sample with variance 2. The time 
invariant variables are often difficult to measure or hard to obtain. For example, a sector-specific 
production technology may allow the dispersion of phases of production process better in that 
sector than in another sector. This production technology varies across sectors but it is not 
expected to change very much in a short time period. 
Taking into account these three aspects (potential industry unobserved heterogeneity, 
dynamic nature of the model and endogeneity of some explanatory variables), the appropriate 
estimator is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). They suggest first differencing the model to get rid of the industry specific effects and 
then using valid instruments (lagged values of the instrumented variables) to deal with the 
problem that by construction the new error term is correlated with the lagged dependent variable. 
The use of instruments is also required to control for the potential endogeneity of other 
explanatory variables. We use at least three lagged values of unit labour cost as instruments for 
the equations in first differences to control for the potential influence of current outsourcing level 
on current unit labour cost. The same lagged values are chosen for the rest of the endogenous 
variables. Since national ownership is assumed to be strictly exogenous, it is instrumented with 
itself. 
A draw back of the difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) is that when 
first differences are taken, time invariant variables are wiped out. So, the estimator does not use 
cross sectional information reflected in the differences between industries. Another disadvantage 
is that lagged levels are often poor instruments for the equation in differences, especially in the 
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case of panel with a small number of time periods with highly persistent data.  It can cause large 
finite-sample biased and poor precision in the estimators. To reduce this problem associated with 
the difference GMM estimator, we use a new estimator, the system GMM, developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator is based on an 
augmented system that includes the regression in differences in addition to the regression in 
levels with lagged differences as instruments. The second part of the system requires the 
additional assumption of no correlation between the variables in differences and the unobserved 
industry effects, although there may be correlation between the levels of the explanatory 
variables and the fixed effects.  
Some summary statistics for the variables used are provided in Table 3. We observe that, 
in manufacturing industry labour cost are about 20 percent of the output value and about 30 
percent of the output is sold to foreign markets. In addition to, small firms as well as firms 
without any foreign participation are clearly predominant in Spanish industry (around 80 percent 
of total industries). Table 4 presents the simple correlations between pairs of variables. Since the 
correlations between the independent variables are small (except between the shares of small 
firms and national firms), we interpret there are not multicollinearity problem in the regressions. 
In addition, we see that outsourcing is positively correlated with most of the independent 
variables, mainly with levels of the unit labour costs, the proportion of domestic firms and the 
high skill requirements. Nevertheless, the outsourcing intensity is determined jointly with these 
variables and other factors which have to be controlled. For these reasons, an econometric 
analysis is applied.  
IV. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS. 
The results of the econometric analysis are reported in Table 5. The first column presents 
the outcomes from the estimation of equation (1) using GMM system procedure. The positive 
and significant coefficient of lagged dependent variable indicates a high degree of persistence in 
outsourcing strategy. Moreover, in line with our prior expectations, higher unit labour costs are 
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related to higher level of outsourcing. We can interpret that sectors tend to use fragmentation of 
production as a defensive strategy trying to improve their competitiveness. The positive and 
significant coefficient of unit labour cost is an important result because it provides empirical 
evidence of the cost-cutting motive for outsourcing. Additionally, according to the positive link 
between the share of domestic firms and the outsourcing level, as the percentage of national 
firms increases, so do outsourcing activities. This result would contradict that foreign firms were 
more prone to contract out internal production. In our opinion, this is because the last have been 
located in Spain as production affiliates carrying out parts of the production process for the 
parent firm. Moreover, the dummy variable high skill requirements exhibits a positive and 
significant sign showing that industries intensive in high skilled-labour tend to farm out internal 
production more intensively. Lastly, two variables, the percentage of small firms and the export 
propensity, are statistically insignificant. Most of the time dummy variables are highly 
significant although, in order to spare space, the coefficients are omitted from the results table. 
Consistency of the GMM estimators depends on the validity of the instruments which is 
examined by four specifications tests. The first is the Sargan test of overidentifying restriction. 
The Sargan test does not reject the validity of the instruments employed in the estimation 
process. Since system GMM used additional moment conditions over the difference GMM, a 
Sargan Difference test can be employed to examine the validity of these additional instruments 
obtained from the equation in levels. The Sargan difference test does not rejected the validity of 
them (2[8]=5.53). The validity of the instruments also requires the lack of second order serial 
correlation in the dynamic formulation whereas, by construction, first-order correlation is 
expected even with uncorrelated original error term. Two additional tests are included to 
examine the absence serial correlation in first differenced residuals. The null hypothesis of no 
second order correlation cannot be rejected and we can conclude that original error is not serially 
correlated.  
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We test the robustness of the regressions by removing those variables which do not have 
a significant impact on the dependent variable. The column 2 of Table 5 presents the results from 
the estimation of equation (1) excluding the share of small firms whereas we have removed the 
export propensity in the column 3. According to the System GMM estimations, the positive 
coefficients for previous outsourcing intensity, unit labour cost, national ownership and skill 
requirements remain robust. Moreover, the negative coefficient of the share of small firms turns 
out significant when export propensity is not included. According to this result, those sectors 
where the share of small firms is lower outsource more internal production than the rest, pointing 
the existence of less difficulties in searching specialized outside producers for large firms.  
Taking into account the interaction between the share of small firms and the export 
propensity variable, we use a variable for international market penetration measured as the 
percentage of firms in each sector whose main market is foreignxii (column 4 and of table 5). In 
this case, both variables (size variable and foreign market penetration) are significant. The 
positive and significant coefficient points out that outsourcing intensity grows when the 
proportion of firms which produce mostly to foreign markets does. By this way, firms orientated 
mainly to international markets would use more intensively outsourcing strategy. A greater 
pressure to improve their efficiency and competitiveness or a greater probability to find 
specialized suppliers could explain this outcome. 
Finally, table 5 contains a last column where the model for a sub-sample of more 
homogeneous 3-digits sector is estimatedxiii. In particular, we have considered exclusively labour 
intensive sectors according to Peneder taxonomy. Previous outsourcing level and unit labour 
costs remains positive and highly significant pointing out the robustness of the empirical 
estimates for these variables. For labour intensive sector, neither firm size nor national 
ownership seem to have an significant impact on outsourcing intensity. On the contrary, export 
propensity shows a positive and significant coefficient.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS. 
In this paper we have investigated the determinants of outsourcing of internal production 
using industry level data for Spanish economy. Our study covers 93 manufacturing sectors and 
the period 1993-2002. We observe that manufacturing industries are fragmenting the value chain 
and they are opting increasingly for contracting out production works to specialized providers.  
We test a model where the outsourcing intensity at industry-level depends on lagged level 
of outsourcing, unit labour cost, share of domestic firms, proportion of small firms, export 
propensity and skill requirements. We employ the system-GMM estimator proposed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) that provides better instruments when right-hand variables are persistent over 
time. 
We find that current level of outsourcing is highly related to previous outsourcing 
intensity, that is, outsourcing exhibits hysteresis. The market transaction costs associated to 
contracting out production are probably higher when firms make the decision of outsourcing 
(some of them are even sunk costs). In due course, some of these costs will be reduced and so the 
advantages of in-house production will be dropped. Therefore, if firms are achieving their 
objectives of gaining flexibility and decreasing costs, the outsourcing strategy will be used more 
and more intensively allowing firms to concentrate on their innermost core competence.  
Furthermore, our results show that the unit labour costs affect positively the ratio of 
production works that are contracted out to external providers related to output. The pressure of 
low-cost competitors could be more intensive in manufacturing industries with higher unit labour 
costs and, therefore, they would be mostly encouraged to outsource production works to cheap 
and specialized contract manufacturers. We find significant evidence for the positive link 
between the outsourcing intensity and the share of domestic firms, the orientation to foreign 
markets as well as the high skill requirements. Finally, we observe a negative effect of the share 
of small firms on outsourcing intensity. 
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Table 1: Sectoral disaggregation of Industrial Companies Survey 2002 
 
Manufactures of food products, beverages and tobacco Manufacture of fabricated metal products 
151 Production, processing, preserving of meat, meat products 2811 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures 
152 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 2812 Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery of metal 
153 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 282 Manufacture of tanks, central heating radiators and boilers 
154 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 283 Manufacture of steam generators 
155 Manufacture of dairy products 284 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal 
156 Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products 2851 Treatment and coating of metals 
157 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 2852 General mechanical engineering 
1581-2 Manufacture of bread, biscuits and bakery products 286 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware 
1583-4 Manufacture of sugar, cocoa and chocolate 287 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products 
1585-9 Manufacture of other food products Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
1591-7 Manufacture of alcoholic beverages 291 Manufacture of machinery for the production of mechanical power 
1598 Production of mineral waters and soft drinks 292 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 
160 Tobacco products 293 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather and footwear 294 Manufacture of machine-tools 
171 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 295-6 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery and weapons 
172 Textile weaving 297 Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c. 
173 Finishing of textiles Manufacture of office machinery, computers and precision equipment 
174 Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel 300 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
175 Manufacture of other textiles 331 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment 
176 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics 332-5 Manufacture of instruments for measuring and optical instruments 
177 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles Manufacture of electrical equipment 
181-2 Manufacture of leather clothes and other wearing apparel 311 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur 312 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 
191 Tanning and dressing of leather 313 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 
192 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddler 315 Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps 
193 Manufacture of footwear 314/316 Manufacture of accumulators and electrical equipment n.e.c. 
Manufactures of paper, paper products, publishing and printing 321 Manufacture of electronic valves and other electronic components 
211 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 322 Manufacture of television, radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony
212 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard 323 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording  
221 Publishing Manufacture of transport equipment 
222-3 Printing and service activities related to printing 341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 
Manufacture of chemical 342 Manufacture of bodies for motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 343 Manufacture of parts, accessories for motor vehicles 
242 Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products 351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 
243 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings 352 Manufacture of railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock 
244 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal and botanical products 353 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 
245 Manufacture of soap, detergents, cleaning, polishing 354-5 Manufacture of motorcycles and other transport equipment n.e.c. 
246 Manufacture of other chemical products Manufacture of wood, furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
247 Manufacture of man-made fibres 201 Sawmilling and planning of wood, impregnation of wood 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 202 Manufacture of veneer sheets and other panels and boards 
251 Manufacture of rubber products 203 Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery 
252 Manufacture of plastic products 204 Manufacture of wooden containers 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 2051 Manufacture of other products of wood 
261 Manufacture of glass and glass products 2052 Manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials 
262 Manufacture of ceramic goods 361 Manufacture of furniture 
263-4 Manufacture of construction products 362 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 
265 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 364-5 Manufacture of sports goods and games and toys 
266 Manufacture of articles of concrete, plaster, cement 363/366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c. 
267 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone  
268 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  
Manufacture of basic metals  
271 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys (ECSC)  
272 Manufacture of tubes  
273 Other first processing of iron and steel   
274 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals  
275 Casting of metals  
Page 18 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
19
Table 2: Outsourcing explanatory variables and expected signs in previous literature 
Variable Expected sign Previous works 
Labour costs + 
Abraham and Taylor (1996) 
Girma and Görg (2004) 
Görg and Hanley (2004) 
Holl (2004) 
Q Abraham and Taylor (1996) 
Firm Size 
+ Tomiura (2005) 
Holl (2004) 
Market Size 
[Export propensity] 
+
McLaren (2000) 
Grossman and Helpman (2002) 
[Görg and Hanley (2004)] 
Q Girma and Görg (2004) 
Görg and Hanley (2004) National ownership 
+ Holl (2004) 
Previous outsourcing 
level +
Girma and Görg (2004) 
Swenson (2004) 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 1993 2002 1993-2002 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Outsourcing 3.83 3.59 5.11 4.71 4.49 4.17 
Unit Labour Cost 24.27 7.68 18.26 5.98 19.55 6.78 
% Small Firms 79.21 12.18 74.91 13.21 77.55 13.20 
Export Propensity 28.01 20.07 31.16 19.46 29.76 19.28 
National Ownership 77.53 12.14 77.41 13.10 77.14 12.37 
Foreign market penetration 5.15 3.59 8.02 4.98 6.78 4.64 
Skills (dummy) 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.28 
Source: Industrial Companies Survey, Comext, Survey of Firm Strategies and Peneder (1999). 
Note: All the variables are before taking logarithms. 
Table 4: Simple Correlations between variables 
Outsourcing ULC % Small firms 
Export 
Propensity
National 
Ownership
Foreign-market 
penetration Skills 
Outsourcing 1.000             
Unit Labor Cost 0.440 1.000           
% Small Firms 0.155 0.176 1.000         
Export Prop. 0.184 0.153 -0.320 1.000       
National Own. 0.385 0.159 0.421 -0.183 1.000     
Foreign-market penet. 0.184 0.042 -0.293 0.411 -0.126 1.000   
Skills 0.321 0.281 -0.080 0.249 -0.109 0.298 1.000
Source: Industrial Companies Survey, Comext, Survey of Firm Strategies and Peneder (1999). 
Note: All the variables are before taking logarithms. The number of observations is 870. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Outsourcing (GMM Regression Results). 
 
Parameters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outsourcingt-1 0.802*** 0.789*** 0.802*** 0.827*** 0.922*** 
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.018) 
ULC 0.288*** 0.282** 0.255** 0.159** 0.107** 
 (0.097) (0.128) (0.126) (0.072) (0.048) 
%Small-firms -0.031 -0.277*  -0.233* -0.055 
 (0.101) (0.151)  (0.132) (0.047) 
National-ownership 0.342** 0.533*** 0.365*** 0.443*** 0.308 
 (0.136) (0.169) (0.135) (0.135) (0.209) 
Export-propensity -0.005  -0.015  0.013* 
 (0.028)  (0.033)  (0.006) 
Foreign-market penetration    0.010*  
 (0.006)  
Standardization -0.084* -0.097* -0.114* -0.067  
 (0.050) (0.057) (0.061) (0.052)  
High Skills 0.033* 0.040 0.040** 0.037*  
 (0.017) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018)  
Constant -0.674** -0.595* -0.196 -0.424 -0.062 
 (0.268) (0.317) (0.359) (0.257) (0.145) 
Observations 783 828 783 828 207 
Sectors 87 92 87 92 23 
Test (p-values)           
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.318 0.337 0.329 0.381 0.189 
Sargan test 1.000 0.993 0.994 1.000 1.000 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; statistically significant * at 10%, ** at 5*, *** at 1%. 
All equations include year dummies. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of first and second order serial correlation. 
Sargan is a test of the over-identifiying restrictions (twostep estimations). P-values below 0.05 suggest a rejection of 
the validity of the instruments at the 5% critical level. 
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Figure 1: Dimensions of Fragmentation of Production.
Independent Outside Supplier   
 
(1) Intra-firm national fragmentation 
(2) Inter-firm national fragmentation (national outsourcing) 
(3) Inter-firm international fragmentation (international outsourcing) 
(4) Intra-firm international fragmentation (FDI is required). 
Source: Own elaboration from Kimura and Ando (2005) and Curzon Price (2001). 
 
Enterprise 
Enterprise Group
Production 
subsidiary Production 
subsidiary
Independent 
Outside Supplier 
Frontier 
(2) 
(1) 
(3) 
(4) 
Page 21 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
22
Figure 2: Outsourcing of Internal Production: Level in 2002 and Change 1993-2002
(Production works carried out by other companies / Gross production, in percentage; change in percentage points)
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Figure 3: Outsourcing of production according to industry taxonomy based on factor 
inputs
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Mainstream manufacturing
Source: Industrial Companies Survey 2002 (National Statistical Institute of Spain) and Peneder (1999). 
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i See Piore and Saber (1984). The higher flexibility can be obtained through flexible production which allows firms 
to adapt standardized inputs to a variety of specifications (Eckel, 2004). Through flexible production, firms can alter 
the final goods they provide according to the specific needs or desires of their customers. 
ii Nevertheless, fragmentation of production and outsourcing are often treated as synonymous. The term outsourcing 
comes from the compound expression “outside resource using”. Along this paper, the terms outside and external 
refer to outside or external to the firm. 
iii The Economist has recently published a survey of outsourcing, in which is pointed that “manufacturing has 
already gone a long way down the road of outsourcing” (The Economist, November 13th 2004). 
iv Tomiura (2005) employs a similar indicator but, as pointed out above, he uses cross-section data. Holl (2004) opt 
for a narrower indicator, the subcontracting of products, parts and components, to study the probability of 
outsourcing. At last, Girma and Görg (2004) use a bit wider measure, the industrial services receive, which 
comprises activities such as processing of inputs but also certain services as maintenance of production machinery 
or engineering services. 
v Various types of outsourcing exist in the manufacturing industries depending on the relationship between the 
principal and the third-party company. Subcontracting is a particular case where a “dominant/dominated” 
relationship is created. Specifically, subcontracts correspond to the relationship between two companies (the 
subcontractor and the main contractor), where the subcontractor company participates in the production process of a 
particular product, which belongs to the contractor company. The subcontract conditions require the main contractor 
to provide a diagram and precise technical specifications for the manufacture of the product, as well as the supply of 
its main raw materials. 
vi In the context of transaction costs and contractual incompleteness Grossman and Helpman (2002) examine 
theoretically the decision between outsourcing or vertical integration of intermediate inputs (make or buy decision)
taking into account the costs that arise from search frictions and imperfect contracting and the costs of running a 
larger and less specialized organization. To consider the international dimension as well as the ownership 
dimension, Antras and Helpman (2004) develop a theoretical framework in which, based on productivity and 
sectoral characteristics, firms decide whether to integrate into the production of intermediate inputs or outsource 
them and firms also choose the location of inputs production (at home or abroad). 
vii A strategic motive can be added to these usual motives for outsourcing when a firm outsourcing decision affects 
the rivals’ outsourcing decisions and the firm takes into account it in the decision process. Shy and Stenbacka (2003) 
and Buehler and Haucap (2006) study how firms may strategically outsource the productions of inputs analysing the 
trade-off between the fixed cost of investing into in-house production facilities for an input or the higher marginal 
cost for sourcing the input over the market (which is caused by changes in input demand and inputs prices). 
viii This hypothesis is in accordance to Antras (2003) who using a model of outsourcing based on the property rights 
approach shows that final goods in the capital-intensive sector are produced under vertical integration whereas those 
in the labour-intensive sector are outsourced.  
ix This increase is higher than the average scored by German manufacturing enterprises, which has placed in 27% for 
the period 1992-2000 according to Görzig and Stephan (2002). However, it should be noted that the fragmentation 
processes in German industry had most probably taken place before the 1990s.  
x The sector “Manufacture of office machiney and computers” has been removed from the econometric analysis. 
The data in 2002 show a sharp decrease of output which is not present in employment or number of enterprises 
suggesting a measure error for that year. Since the indicador of outsourcing used is calculated related to output, the 
level of fragmentation will be overestimated. 
xi Although some American and British firms have already begun to outsource some of their business services 
abroad (so far mostly to India), the outsourcing of white-collar work is still only emerging (The Economist,
November 13th 2004). 
xii Following Piga and Vivarelli (2003) those firms which face tougher foreign competition may exhibit a stronger 
tendency to cooperate. For this reason, we also could expect that firms competing in international markets were 
more prone to engage in outsourcing agreements.  
xiii The author is grateful to the anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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